Ethical problems of in vitro fertilization1
It is important that any views on in vitro fertilization (IVF) are based on argument rather than sentiment. Future advantages, therapeutic or scientific, should be weighed against present and future harm. Moral questions such as those involved in IVF are questions that involve not only a calculation of consequence but also strong sentiments with regard to the nature of the proposed activities themselves.
Many regard IVF as a legitimate new technique for helping the childless, and this is probably how most doctors look at it. Those who disagree feel that it is fundamentally wrong, that the practice 1Based on paper read to Section of Obstetrics & Gynaecology, 30 November 1984 0141-0768/85/100799-02/$02.00/0 represents a deviation from normal sexual intercourse, and that the unitive and procreative aspects of intercourse should not be separated. They maintain that this is an absolute moral principle which must be upheld without exception. There are also reservations with regard to the consequences of IVF. These begin when IVF results in more embryos being brought into existence than will be transferred to the mother's uterus. This is less of a difficulty now, as embryos can be frozen. However, when a couple who have produced a frozen embryo die, what should happen to the embryo and who owns it? The Warnock Committee suggested the responsibility for its disposal should pass to the storage authority.
Where the gametes come from husband and wife, and the resultant embryo is implanted in the wife's uterus, ethical difficulties are minimal. But is it acceptable for one woman to donate an egg to another? Some are concerned at the introduction of a third party into a marriage, with its consequences for the child and society.
The most contentious issue is the question of research on human embryos. There are some who hold that an embryo should not be deprived of a chance for development and should not be used for research. They would give moral approval for IVF only if each embryo produced were to be transferred to a uterus. However, it can be argued that while it is not denied that human embryos are alive and it can be said that eggs and sperm are alive, embryos are not yet human persons. When it is decided at what point an embryo becomes a person it can be decided when it might be permissible for research on embryos to be undertaken. Some believe that the embryo has moral rights from the time of fertilization. The human embryo is seen as having the same status as a child or an adult by virtue of its potential for human life. The right to life is held to be a fundamental human right, and the taking of human life in this view will always be abhorrent. Those who hold this view give the embryo the same status as an adult.
The opposing view is that the human embryo cannot be thought of as a person. It is simply a collection of cells which, unless it implants in a human uterine environment, has no potential for development. There is no reason, therefore, to accord these cells any protective status. If useful results can be obtained by research on embryos then such research should be permitted. The Warnock Committee thought that although the human embryo was entitled to some measure of respect because of the fact that it was human, that respect could not be absolute and must be weighed against the benefits arising from research.
Before the technique of IVF was first practised in 1970 there had already been much embryo research. If one accepts IVF, it is difficult not to accept the experimentation that went before it and that it should continue. It is to be hoped that such research will be allowed to continue in accordance with the recommendation of the Warnock Committee.
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University ofGlasgow and President, Royal College ofObstetricians and Gynaecologists Cum mula peperit 'Once in a blue moon', so the story goes, a mule gives birth to celebrate a historic event-for example, Caesar has been born. But science will have none of this. These hybrid animals are officially sterile and evidence to prove the opposite is often impossible to obtain. Thus the pregnancy may not have been detected nor the birth witnessed, and lactation by a mule is ascribed to the psychological effects of bonding to another mother's foal. Nevertheless, the story recurs and there is some uniformity in the reports. Thus mules mated to stallions usually produce horse or horselike foals and when the mating is to a jack donkey a mule or mule-like foal results. Chandley (1981) explains this on a hypothesis invoking 'affinity'. Here the whole paternal set of donkey chromosomes clings together and is extruded in the polar body, while the entire maternal horse set goes to the egg and is ready for fertilization by either a stallion or a jack donkey spermatozoan. If affinity did not operate, the mule egg would be expected to contain both horse and donkey chromosomes. Invariably, however, pairing between the horse and donkey chromosomes is grossly interfered with and few mature gametes are made. Herein lies the clue to the usual infertility of the mule, for it has been shown that the hybrid uterus and hormone control is competent. Thus oestrus may occur, and Davies et al. (1985) have shown that the uterus of the mule can carry either a horse or a donkey embryo and bring it to term.
Nevertheless, invoking affinity does not completely solve the problem, for chromosomally a bonded foal might fit the Chandley bill but maternity is in no sense proved: what is needed are family blood group or enzyme studies.
The fertile mule reported from China in this issue by Rong et al. (p 821) has been referred to previously by Clarke (1983, 1984) , but it has taken
